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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALICE M. ALFORD, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
THE UTAH LEAGUE OF CITIES 
AND TOWNS, an unincorporated 
association, JAN T. FURNER, 
KENNETH H. BULLOCK, CAROL A. 
KOTLER, MICHELE REILLY, JAMI 
ADAMSON, JACK A. RICHARDS and 
JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 10, 
individuals, 
Defendants-Respondents• 
Case No. 880312 
Argument Priority 
Classification 14(b) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court 
pursuant to 78-2-2 (3) (i), Utah Code Annotated in that 
this is an appeal from an Order granting defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, which Order was made by 
the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge of the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, on the 8th 
day of July, 1988. The Court of Appeals does not have 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. 
THE COURT ERRORED BY FAILING TO ISSUE A 
BRIEF WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE GROUNDS 
FOR GRANTING RESPONDENTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS REQUIRED BY RULE 52(a) 
OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
II. 
THE COURT ERRORED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
III. 
APPELLANT DID NOT CONSENT TO THE 
PUBLICATION OF DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS. 
IV. 
IF RESPONDENTS WERE ENTITLED TO CLAIM 
QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE, IT WAS ABUSED. 
V. 
APPELLANT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO COMPLY 
WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF THE 
UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
VI. 
RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO AN 
ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondents filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
on June 13, 1988 (R91). The Memorandum in support of 
their Motion contained four different grounds on which 
respondents claimed they were entitled to summary 
judgment. (R92-121) 
The Motion was heard and argued on July 8, 1988 
before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson. At the 
conclusion of argument of counsel, Judge Wilkinson 
orally granted defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment 
without further statement or identification as to 
grounds (R314). Appellant filed her Notice of Appeal 
on August 5, 1988. (R317) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Utah League of Cities and Towns is an 
organization formed by the municipalities of the State 
of Utah pursuant to the Interlocal Co-operation Act, 
11-13-1, et seq., Utah Code Annotated. 
Appellant became an employee of the League on 
or about May 16, 1983. During her employment, she 
assumed various responsibilities in connection with the 
League's operation and management. In 198 6, appellant 
served as Director of Administrative Services and 
reported directly to respondent Jan T. Furner. 
On October 3, 1986, respondent Furner 
terminated appellant's employment with the League. The 
reason for termination listed on the separation notice 
was "insubordination and unwillingness to work with 
co-workers". (All of the above are allegations in 
appellant's Complaint and admitted by respondents. R3, 
4, 30) 
Appellant retained Vincent C. Rampton as her 
counsel to inquire into the specifics of the 
allegations in her separation notice. On 
October 16, 1986, Mr. Rampton wrote a letter to the 
President of the League stating that the termination 
and reasons expressed therefor had "severly prejudiced 
her in her ability to find employment elsewhere, and 
have damaged her reputation generally in the 
community". Mr. Rampton requested specific instances 
of insubordination and unwillingness to work with 
co-workers sufficient to justify appellant's 
termination and also requested a formal hearing before 
the Board of Directors of the Utah League of Cities and 
Towns, (R254, 255) 
By letter to Mr. Rampton dated 
October 22, 1986, Jack A. Richards, general counsel of 
the League, mailed a report from respondent Furner 
which supposedly justified the termination of the 
appellant. (R293, 294) 
By return letter to Mr. Richards dated 
October 23, 1986, Mr. Rampton criticized the Furner 
report as being unresponsive and inadequate for the 
Board to base a decision. Mr. Rampton also notified 
Mr. Richards that the appellant would be represented at 
the Board meeting on October 24, 1986, for the purpose 
of responding to the charges in Furner's report. 
(R295) 
At the Board of Directors' meeting held on 
October 24, 1986, appellant was represented by counsel, 
Thomas P. Melloy. He was there to set a date for a 
special hearing to consider the appellant's termination 
and also to discuss the procedures by which the hearing 
would go forward. The minutes from the meeting of the 
Board of Directors state that "Mr. Melloy asked for a 
copy of all written statements originally requested by 
Mr. Rampton from staff and Mr. Furner. Mr. Melloy 
agreed that the statements should also be distributed 
to Board members; so they would be prepared for the 
November 10, 1986 meeting". (R298) The accuracy of 
those minutes is disputed. Mr. Melloy specifically 
denied agreeing that statements should be distributed 
in advance to the Board members. (Melloy Affidavit 
R257-260) 
Written statements concerning appellant had 
been obtained from the other respondents by the 
respondent Furner before appellant's termination. All 
other respondents, excluding Jack A. Richards, were 
co-workers of appellant. These initial statements were 
not prepared to support the termination of appellant or 
to be used as evidence at any termination hearing. 
After the October 24, 1986 Board meeting, supplemental 
statements were solicited on the basis that earlier 
written statements were not specific enough. (Michele 
Reilly deposition, pages 5 & 6; Kenneth Bullock 
deposition, pages 7 & 8; Carol Kotler deposition, pages 
8 & 9; Jami Adamson deposition, page 6) 1 The written 
statement of the respondent Furner was not prepared at 
anyone's request, but in anticipation of a subsequent 
Board of Directors' hearing. (Jan Furner deposition, 
pages 4 8 & 49) 1 
The written statements claim, among other 
things, that appellant: 
1. On one or more occasions, appeared at 
public League functions in a severe 
stage of intoxication so as to be 
unable to speak; 
2. On one or more occasions, reported to 
work with a hangover; 
3. Was mentally unstable and unable to 
control her behavior; 
4. Circulated deliberate falsehoods about 
co-workers in an attempt to cause them 
to lose their employment with the 
League; and, 
5. Circulated derogatory statements 
regarding co-workers' personal habits 
and falsely attributed the statements 
to respondent Furner. (Exhibits to 
respondents' depositions)-
Appellant denied the truthfulness or accuracy of each 
of the allegations. (Appellant's deposition, pages 
14-16)1 
These statements were thereafter delivered to 
the League's Board of Directors by the respondent 
Jack A. Richards. (Jack Richards deposition, page 7). 
It was assumed that all depositions and exhibits 
had been filed with Judge Wilkinson in connection 
with respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Numerous references to the depositions and exhibits 
were made in the parties' memorandums. It was only 
when the record was withdrawn to prepare this brief 
that it was learned that the depositions and 
exhibits had never been filed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Judge Wilkinson failed to issue a brief written 
statement of the grounds for the Court's decision in 
granting respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment as 
required by Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
There were factual issues and disputes in this 
case which should have been decided by a fact-finder. 
Appellant's counsel's request to the League for 
information upon which her termination was based was 
not a consent to defamatory statements. It was an 
honest inquiry into the reason for her termination. 
Any qualified privilege that may have been 
available to the respondents was abused because the 
statements were made out of spite, ill will or a desire 
to do her harm. 
These respondents were not engaged in 
governmental activities so at the time this action was 
commenced, appellant was not required to comply with 
the notice requirements of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. 
The Board of Directors of the League is not a 
judicial or quasi judicial body entitled to solicit and 
receive defamatory statements and, thereby, clothe 
respondents with a defense of absolute privilege. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT ERRORED BY FAILING TO ISSUE A 
BRIEF WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE GROUNDS 
FOR GRANTING RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS REQUIRED BY RULE 52(a) 
OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides: 
The trial court need not enter 
findings of fact and conclusions 
of law in rulings on motions, 
except as provided in Rule 41(b). 
The court shall, however, issue 
a brief written statement of the 
ground for its decision on all 
motions granted under Rules 12(b), 
50(a) and (b), 56 and 59 when the 
motion is based on more than one 
ground. 
Respondents• Motion for Summary Judgment was 
filed pursuant to Rule 56. They based their Motion on 
four different grounds, all of which were separate and 
distinct. All had different factual allegations and 
each required a separate legal analysis. 
At the conclusion of oral argument and without 
further identification or articulation as to grounds or 
reasons, Judge Wilkinson granted respondents' Motion. 
Appellant was left to guess at the reason or reasons, 
preventing her from being able to clearly identify any 
specific issue for appeal or focus on any particular 
legal or factual dispute. 
On appellate review, this Court is also left to 
guess whether Judge Wilkinson's granting of the Motion 
was possibly based on faulty legal logic or failure to 
identify factual issues. 
II. 
THE COURT ERRORED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
The Court of Appeals has recently summarized 
the standards for motions for summary judgment. In 
Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 95 UAR 19 (Utah 
App. 1988) , the Court stated: 
Rule 56 (c) authorizes the entry 
of summary judgment "if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law". In considering 
a motion for summary judgment, 
it is not appropriate for a 
court to weigh the evidence or 
assess credibility; the sole 
initial inquiry is whether 
there is a genuine issue of 
material fact. W.M. Barnes Co. 
v. Sohio Natural Resources Co., 
627 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1981). 
Furthermore, it only takes one 
sworn statement to dispute the 
averments on the other side of 
the controversy and create such 
an issue. Id,; Lucky Seven Rodeo 
Corp, v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 752 
(Utah App. 1988). At page 21. 
The Court went on to say: 
Because disposition of a case on 
summary judgment denies the benefit 
of a trial on the merits, this court 
must review the facts and reasonable 
inferences therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the losing party. 
Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank, 
737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987). If, 
after doing so, we conclude there 
is a dispute as to a material issue 
of fact, we must reverse the trial 
court's determination and remand for 
trial on that issue. Id.; Hardy v. 
Prudential Ins. Co., 89 UAR 34, 36 
(Utah App. 1988) At page 21. 
There are numerous factual issues in dispute 
and fair inferences that may be drawn from facts not 
in dispute, all of which should be decided by a jury. 
III. 
APPELLANT DID NOT CONSENT TO THE 
PUBLICATION OF DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS. 
There is a factual dispute as to whether 
appellant's counsel, Thomas P. Melloy, requested or 
approved the distribution of the written statements 
from the various League employees to the Board of 
Directors of the Utah League of Cities and Towns. This 
issue should be decided by a jury. 
Even if it were decided that 
Vincent C. Rampton's letters to the respondents dated 
October 16, 1986 or October 23, 1986, or that 
Mr. Melloy, requested the written statements containing 
the defamatory material, it would still not raise to 
the type of consent which would constitute a defense 
for respondents. 
In their Memorandum in support of their Motion 
for Summary Judgment, respondents quoted Prosser, Law 
of Torts for authority that appellant's request for 
information constituted her consent to defamation. 
That same section quoted by the respondents also says: 
At the same time, of course, it is 
not every request to speak which 
manifests consent to slander, and 
an honest inquiry as to what is 
meant, or an investigation in good 
faith to find out what the defendant 
has been saying, will not bar the 
action, even though it is for the 
ultimate purpose of vindication at 
law. Prosser Law of Torts, Fourth 
Edition, Chapter 19, Defamation, 
Sec. 114. 
Respondents also relied upon 50 Am. Jur.2d, 
Libel and Slander, Section 149. The most recent 
supplement to that Section cited the Restatement, 
Torts (Second), Section 584: 
Honest inquiry by plaintiff 
concerning a defamatory 
publication does not constitute 
defense to action for 
publication. 
Cited also in Am. Jur. is Frank B. Hall and 
Company v. Buck, 678 S.W.2d, 612 (1984, Tex. App. 
Houston 14th Dist.). In Buck, the Court allowed the 
jury to determine whether or not the publication of 
defamatory statements about an employee concerning the 
reasons for his termination were invited by the 
employee sending an investigator to find out the exact 
reasons why his employer had fired him. 
There is a series of cases which by analogy 
suggest that appellant did not consent to this 
defamation. These cases generally hold that an 
employer who makes defamatory statements to an employee 
knowing that the employee would have to himself publish 
the defamatory statements to new prospective employers 
did not amount to a consentual or invited publication 
and, therefore, remained actionable slander. See Lewis 
v
- Equitable Life Assur. Soc, 389 N.W.2d 876 (1986 
Minn.); Nabors v. Kirksville College of Osteopathic 
Medicine, 694 S.W.2d 822 (1985, Mo. App.); First State 
Bank v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d 696 (1980, Tex. Civ. App. 
Corpus Christi); and Grist v. Upjohn Co., 168 N.W.2d 
389 (1969 Mich.). 
In Grist, the Court held that the jury could 
find publication of slander by the defendant company 
even though the plaintiff herself had communicated the 
slanderous statements to a third party. The plaintiff 
claimed that she had been discharged by the defendant 
for unfounded reasons and that she was compelled to 
repeat those reasons to perspective employers when they 
questioned her concerning past employment. The Court 
went on to say that even though the plaintiff herself 
had caused the defamatory statements to be published, 
the defendant had reason to know that that information 
would come to the knowledge of a third person and, 
therefore, the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff 
was not in error. 
The October 16, 1986 letter from 
Vincent C. Rampton to respondents was nothing more than 
an honest inquiry on the part of appellant into the 
specific reasons for her termination which, in her 
opinion, were defamatory by alleging insubordination 
and unwillingness to work with co-workers. That 
inquiry cannot be held as a matter of law to constitute 
a consent to publication. 
The October 23, 1986 correspondence from 
Mr. Rampton did not request additional information, but 
even if it could be inferred that additional 
information was being requested, it was nothing more 
than an extension of the prior inquiry into the reasons 
for appellant's termination. In any event, neither of 
those letters ask that the information be communicated 
to anyone other than appellant and her counsel. 
There is a dispute as to what was said at the 
October 24, 1986 meeting and whether it was a consent 
to publication. Mr. Melloy denied agreeing to the 
distribution of any written statements to the Board of 
Directors. That dispute alone should be sufficient to 
allow this case to go to the jury. 
IV. 
IF RESPONDENTS WERE ENTITLED TO CLAIM 
QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE, IT WAS ABUSED. 
Respondents have claimed that the distribution 
of the written statements to the Board of Directors of 
the Utah League of Cities and Towns constituted a 
qualified privilege because there was a common interest 
in the subject matter. The right, consent or necessity 
of distributing those written statements to the Board 
of Directors is in dispute and should be submitted to a 
fact-finder. Even if it could be said that some 
qualified privilege existed, appellant claims that 
respondents have abused that privilege. The issue then 
becomes what appellant must do to show abuse of a 
qualified privilege and whether or not that issue is a 
question of fact or law. 
In Direct Import Buyers Association v. KSL, 
Inc., 538 P.2d 1040 (Utah, 1975), the Court said: 
The malice which plaintiff must 
show in order to overcome a 
conditional privilege is simply 
an improper motive such as a 
desire to do harm. . . 
Richardson v. Grand Central Corporation, 572 
P.2d 395 (Utah, 1977), said that a qualified privilege 
is abused where the publication arises from "spite, ill 
will or hatred toward the plaintiff, or that there was 
excessive publication motivated by a desire to do him 
harm". 
The question of the nature of proof of malice 
and whether or not it is a matter of fact or law is 
addressed in 50 Am. Jur.2d Libel and Slander, Section 
Whether malice in fact exists 
depends on the circumstances; 
the determination as to whether 
it exists so as to destroy the 
defense of privilege depends, 
or may depend, upon the form in 
which the defamatory words were 
put by the defendant, taken in 
connection with the knowledge or 
information which the defendant 
had as to the matter of the 
defamatory statements. The 
question is usually one of fact 
for the jury, but the existence of 
malice may be determined by the 
Court as a matter of law if only 
one inference can reasonably be 
drawn from the evidence. It is the 
duty of the trial judge to withdraw 
the issue of the existence of malice 
from consideration of the jury, 
where there is no evidence, or not 
more than a scintilla of evidence, 
thereof. 
In this case, the very nature of the 
accusations made by respondents suggest a spitefulness 
or ill will against the appellant. Respondents have 
acknowledged that their statements were made to express 
their hard feelings towards appellant. For instance, 
they have said: 
Well, basically he was concerned 
about all the bickering in the 
office, all of the hard feelings 
that had happened during the 
convention, and he just suggested 
that I write it down. (Michelle 
Reilly deposition, page 5) 
It was for Jan's record, just 
about the individual. My 
understanding was that everyone 
was writing it so that he would 
just have a collective — just 
have reference to everyone's 
individual feelings about Alice. 
(Kenneth Bullock deposition, page 8) 
A. Just to put down my thoughts 
regarding the situation. 
Q. What situation was it? 
A. The Alice Alford situation. 
Q. What was the Alice Alford 
situation at that time? 
A. Just the problems we were 
having in our office. (Carol 
Kotler deposition, page 10) 
All she said was that everyone was 
writing down their feelings, just 
venting it to get it off your chest. 
(Jami Adamson deposition, page 7) 
It was abundantly clear that these statements 
were initially prepared by these respondents to air 
their own feelings of ill will towards appellant. They 
were not prepared for distribution to a Board of 
Directors or to support her employment termination. In 
any event, given the nature of the allegations 
contained in the statements and the reasons for having 
prepared them, there is a reasonable inference that 
could be drawn that the statements go beyond the nature 
of any qualified privilege that may exist. At the very 
least, it should be a question of fact. 
V. 
APPELLANT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO COMPLY 
WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF THE 
UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
Respondents correctly argued that 63-30-11, 
Utah Code Annotated, requires a notice of claim to be 
served upon a governmental entity before bringing a 
civil action. Respondents claimed in their Memorandum 
that appellant admitted that the Utah League of Cities 
and Towns was a governmental entity subject to 
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
Respondents did not identify where appellant supposedly 
made that admission and it is specifically urged here 
that appellant made no such admission. 
Appellant acknowledges that respondent Utah 
League of Cities and Towns is a political subdivision 
organized pursuant to the Interlocal Co-operation Act, 
11-13-1, Utah Code Annotated, but all political 
subdivisions do not fall within the provisions of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
At the time this action was initiated 
(December, 1986) , employees or political subdivisions 
who were engaged in nongovernmental activities were not 
entitled to the notice requirements of the Governmental 
Immunity Act. See Schultz v. Conger, 755 P.2d 165 
(Utah, 1988). 
There was no evidence presented to Judge 
Wilkinson upon which he could make a legal 
determination that respondents were engaged in 
governmental activities, or that the termination of 
appellant's employment was a governmental activity. 
VI. 
RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO AN 
ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE. 
Respondents argued that since appellant 
requested a copy of her personnel file pursuant to the 
provisions of 67-18-1, Utah Code Annotated, she 
therefore must have requested a hearing pursuant to the 
provisions of the Utah State Personnel Act found in 
67-19-1, et. seq. , Utah Code Annotated and, thereby 
turned the Utah League of Cities and Towns and its 
Board of Directors into a quasi judicial body which 
then clothed them with the defense of absolute 
privilege against any claims of defamation. This is an 
impossible stretch of logic and is not suggested by any 
of the pleadings or other competent evidence. 
Hurst v. Farmer, 697 P.2d 280 (Wash. 1985), 
cited by respondents in their earlier Memorandum, 
involved statements of female co-workers provided to 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission at the 
Commission's request in connection with sexual 
harassment charges filed with the Commission by the 
plaintiff. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
has a duty under the Federal Civil Rights Act to 
investigate complaints of sexual harassment. Their 
duties and responsibilities can, in no way, be equated 
to a hearing that was to be held by the Board of 
Directors of the Utah League of Cities and Towns. 
In the tape-recorded portion of the meeting on 
October 24, 1986, there was some question as to whether 
or not the League was even obligated to hold a hearing 
and the League's counsel, in commenting upon this, 
said: 
I don't know what will happen if 
we don't have a hearing. It will 
be up to Alice and her people. 
The wise thing to do is to have a 
hearing and give an opportunity 
for everybody to relate their side 
of the situation and for the Board 
to make its determination. This 
hearing is not a trial. You're 
not a civil service board. It's 
a business decision that you as a 
Board directing this organization 
would make as a business decision. 
(See Exhibit B, Defendant's 
Response to Plaintiff's First 
Request for Production of Documents) 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse Judge Wilkinson's Order granting respondents' 
Motion for Summary Judgment and remand the matter for 
trial. 
Alternatively, the case should be remanded with 
instructions to Judge Wilkinson that he identify which 
ground or grounds upon which he relied in granting 
respondents' Motion. 
ADDENDUM 
Attached is a copy of the Order granting Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
DATED this ^J-— day of December, 1988. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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BRIAN R. FLORENCE 
Attorney for 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
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Ogden, UT 84401 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALICE M. ALFORD, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE UTAH LEAGUE OF CITIES AND 
TOWNS, an unincorporated 
association; JAN T. FURNER, 
KENNETH H. BULLOCK, CAROL A. 
KOTLER, MICHELE REILLY, JAMI 
ADAMSON, JACK A. RICHARDS and 
JOHN DOES 1 through 10, 
individuals, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C86-9573 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
On July 8, 1988, defendants' motion for summary 
judgment came on for hearing before the above entitled court, the 
Honorable Homer Wilkinson presiding. Plaintiff was represented 
by her counsel, Brian Florence and defendants were represented by 
their counsel, Stephen G. Morgan. The Court, having reviewed the 
file and the memoranda submitted by counsel for both sides and 
having heard the arguments of counsel and being fully advised in 
the premises, now enters its order as follows: 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment should be and 
the same hereby is granted. 
DATED this n day of July, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
IOVED AS TO FORM: 
Brian Florence 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Homer Wilkinson 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Order on this the % day of July, 1988 to: 
Brian R. Florence 
Florence and Hutchison 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
818-26th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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